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Abstract—We introduce a new cryptographic protocol, called
Deep Ocean, that implements a blockchain-agnostic dark pool for
cryptocurrencies. Deep Ocean is a layer-two protocol, meaning
that it can work with any two cryptocurrencies, as long as
there exists an underlying settlement mechanism, for example
performing atomic swaps.
I. INTRODUCTION
In finance, a dark pool is a private exchange for trading
financial instruments such as securities. It differs from other
exchanges in that its order is not public, only the exchange
operators have access to it. Thus it is not possible to see how
much liquidity exists on either side of the market.
The name comes from the fact that price discovery is
not possible in dark pools. Since the trades are not revealed
until some time after their execution, the market is no longer
transparent.
Dark pools are especially attractive to traders who want
to buy or sell large blocks of securities. Performing these
large trades in an open exchange will cause market impact
and invite front-running from other exchange participants, thus
increasing the cost of the trade. When trading in dark pools,
traders do not need to worry about these problems since
their order will not be known to anyone except the exchange
operators.
Another frequent user of dark pools are hedge funds, who
wish to be able to trade without ’showing their hand’ to other
traders. Dark pools either do not release their trade history or
do so with as much delay as legally allowed.
All these problems also exist in cryptocurrency exchanges,
thus a need exists for dark pools in the cryptocurrency world.
Deep Ocean is such a dark pool. It is a protocol that is executed
between an exchange operator and its users, allowing the
exchange to maintain an order book without actually learning
the order sizes. Furthermore, it is agnostic to the settlement
method so, when used with atomic swaps, it allows for non-
custodial trades.
II. OVERVIEW
Deep Ocean can work with any pair of blockchains, as long
as there is some way of settling the trade. It can be by an
atomic swap, or by a decentralized exchange or even by using
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a centralized exchange. The only function of Deep Ocean is to
allow two parties to agree on the details of their trade without
revealing a priori their order sizes.
In order to do this, Deep Ocean requires a third-party. The
third-party is only needed to relay messages between the two
parties and to punish them if they don’t follow the protocol.
It is impossible for the third-party to learn the order size, or
any other private information, of any one of the parties so, the
third-party does not need to be trusted.
The role of the third-party will normally be played by an
exchange operator, and the other two parties will be exchange
users. In this setup, if one of the users deviates from the
protocol, the exchange operator will expel him from the dark
pool. This forces the users to follow through with the trade
after they start the protocol.
Deep Ocean follows the design of older dark pools and
matches all orders at market price. This means that the
exchange operator also has the responsibility of providing the
current market price to the dark pool users 1. This method
results in a faster and more liquid exchange, since all orders
can be matched against each other, which is crucial because
most users of dark pools prefer liquidity and speed over price
2.
Let us imagine three parties: Alice and Bob, who are users
of the dark pool, and Eve, who is the dark pool operator. All
messages between Alice and Bob go through Eve. We assume
that Alice and Bob may be malicious and Eve is honest-but-
curious, meaning that she follows the protocol but will try to
get any information that she can. The Deep Ocean protocol
then works as follows:
1) Both Alice and Bob register with Eve to become valid
users. This is an one-time step and can be something as
simple as providing an email address or more involved
like a KYC/AML registration process.
2) Both Alice and Bob send their orders to Eve. The orders
consist of the asset they wish to buy, the asset which they
wish to sell and, optionally, the limit price.
1Since the users can easily verify the current price by themselves, for
example by checking that the price is consistent with the price reported by
coinmarketcap.com, they do not need to trust the exchange operator.
2It is also possible to modify the Deep Ocean protocol in order to allow
limit orders, and consequently matching at prices different than market price.
This modification will also hide the limit prices of each order, in addition to
their size. However, this will result in a slower dark pool.
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3) Eve then tries to match buyers and sellers. If the current
market price exceeds the limit price, the order isn’t con-
sidered. When a match is found, Eve sends a message to
both parties stating that they were matched at the current
market price. At this point, both parties need to confirm
that they wish to proceed with the trade. If they confirm,
they must complete the trade or be punished.
4) Alice and Bob then run a secure comparison protocol
[1] between themselves to find who has the smallest
order size without revealing their respective order sizes.
Since every message between the two is signed and has
accompanying zero knowledge proofs, it is easy to prove
that malicious behavior has occurred. Eve then punishes
the offending party, maybe by expelling him from the
dark pool or by charging a fine.
5) After running the secure comparison protocol, Alice
and Bob will know who has the smallest order. Let us
imagine it is Bob. Eve now can delete Bob’s order from
her book and she can begin to try to find another match
for Alice, since part of Alice’s order will not be filled
in this trade.
6) Bob now reveals his order size to Eve and Alice. There
is no problem with this since he expects to have his order
completely filled in the next few steps, otherwise Alice
will be punished. No one knows how much of Alice’s
order remains unfilled.
7) Now Alice, Bob and Eve can start the trade settlement.
They already know the price and the size, so they only
need to exchange the rest of the information (addresses,
fees, etc).
Deep Ocean has several advantages over regular cryptocur-
rency exchanges:
• It is blockchain agnostic so it can be used with any
blockchain that supports atomic swaps.
• The exchange operator only needs to be trusted to main-
tain the list of dark pool users and relay the messages.
• Users only reveal their order sizes when they know that
their order is going to be completely filled.
The only disadvantage is that it requires users to be online
during the whole process. Although the comparison protocol
is relatively fast, users may have to wait some time until they
find a counterparty for their trade.
III. NOTATION
Zp is the integer field of order p. So the integers from
0 (inclusive) to p (exclusive). All operations on fields will
be of modular arithmetic. Z∗p is the integer field of order p
except 0. Lower case letters will represent integers, upper case
letters will represent elliptic curve points. H() represents a
hash function, it takes some data (integers, EC points, etc)
and transforms it into an integer.
← means assignment. Ex: x← 0 means ”assign the value 0
to x”. R←− means ”pick at random from”. Ex: z R←− Zp means
”pick a random number from Zp and assign to z”.
We denote the generator element of an elliptic curve as G
and its neutral element as O. The neutral element is the single
point that obeys the following two properties:
• ∀P ∈ Gp : P +O = P
• ∀P ∈ Gp : P − P = O
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BUILDING BLOCKS
A. EC Pedersen commitments
A commitment scheme allows one to commit to a chosen
value while keeping it hidden to others, with the ability to
reveal the committed value later. To do an EC Pedersen
commitment you just need to know two generators G1, G2
of an elliptic curve.
• Commitment: Given a value x ∈ Zp, choose r R←− Z∗p
and calculate C = xG1 + rG2. The commitment is C.
• Reveal: To reveal the commitment just send x and r. The
verifier then checks that C = xG1 + rG2.
B. EC ElGamal
This a variant of ElGamal encryption. For this scheme we
only need an elliptic curve and the corresponding generator
G.
• Key generation: Choose x R←− Zp and calculate P = xG.
x is the private key and P is the public key.
• Encryption: Given a message m ∈ Zp, choose r R←− Z∗p
and calculate A = mG+rP and B = rG. The cyphertext
is (A,B).
• Decryption: Calculate A−xB = (mG+rP )−x(rG) =
(mG+ rP )− rP = mG.
Note that after decryption we only know mG and not m. To
get m we need to break the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. Because of this, this variant of ElGamal can only be
used when m is a small number (less than 32 bits). Thankfully,
all messages that we’ll need to decrypt during this protocol
are only 1-bit long.
C. Proof of knowledge of logarithm
This is a zero knowledge proof that you know an integer
x such that P = xG, where G is a generator of an elliptic
curve.
Public input: P,G
Private input: x
Prover:
1) Choose z R←− Z∗p and calculate A = zG.
2) Calculate c = H(A), c ∈ Zq .
3) Calculate r = z + cx mod q
Proof: A, r
Verifier:
1) Check that rG = A+ cP
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D. Proof of equality of logarithms
This is a zero knowledge proof that you know an integer
x such that P = xG1 and Q = xG2, where G1 and G2 are
generators of an elliptic curve.
Public input: P,G1, Q,G2
Private input: x
Prover:
1) Choose z R←− Z∗p. Calculate A = zG1 and B = zG2.
2) Calculate c = H(A,B), c ∈ Zq .
3) Calculate r = z + cx mod q
Proof: A,B, r
Verifier:
1) Check that rG1 = A+ cP and rG2 = B + cQ
It is trivial to extend this algorithm to prove logarithm
equality between more than two elliptic curve points.
E. Proof that an encrypted value is either 0 or 1
This is a zero knowledge proof that an EC ElGamal
cyphertext (C,D) = (mG + rP, rG) encrypts either 0 or 1
so, m ∈ {0, 1}.
Public input: (C,D), P,G
Private input: m, r
Prover:
1) • if m=0: Choose r1, d1, w
R←− Z∗p. Calculate A1 =
r1G+d1D, B1 = r1P +d1(C−G), A2 = wG and
B2 = wP .
• if m=1: Choose r2, d2, w
R←− Z∗p. Calculate A1 =
wG, B1 = wP , A2 = r2G+d2D and B2 = r2P +
d2C.
2) Calculate c = H(A1, B1, A2, B2), c ∈ Zq .
3) • if m=0: Calculate d2 = c − d1 mod q and r2 =
w − rd2 mod q.
• if m=1: Calculate d1 = c − d2 mod q and r1 =
w − rd1 mod q.
Proof: A1, B1, r1, d1, A2, B2, r2, d2
Verifier:
1) Check that c = d1 + d2 mod q, A1 = r1G + d1D,
B1 = r1P + d1(C − G), A2 = r2G + d2D and B2 =
r2P + d2C.
F. Proof of shuffle
A zero knowledge proof of shuffling is a proof that two
vectors of cyphertexts, ~A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) and ~B =
(B1, B2, . . . , Bn), encrypt the same plaintexts and that a
permutation was applied, without revealing the actual permu-
tation.
We will use a proof of shuffling proposed by Bayer and
Groth [2].
V. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
Now we will describe the Deep Ocean algorithm of Section
II in more detail:
1) There is a server, called Eve, that maintains a list of all
the current participants in the dark pool. It records their
public keys. Alice (i = 1) and Bob (i = 2) are both
part of the dark pool. All communication between Alice
and Bob will happen through Eve.
2) Alice and Bob send their orders to Eve. The order is
the tuple (asset to buy, asset to sell, limit price). In both
cases the limit price is optional.
3) Let us assume that Eve matches Alice and Bob. To do
this, she sends a message to both of them, containing
each others public keys and the current market price.
Alice and Bob check the that the market price is correct.
4) Alice and Bob now confirm that they want to proceed
with the trade. This is the last time that they are able to
abort. If they abort later, they will be punished by Eve.
5) Alice and Bob create a EC keypair (xi, Pi). They send
their public key to each other, together with a ZK proof
of knowledge of logarithm. Finally, each one computes
P = P1 + P2.
6) Let us denote Alice’s and Bob’s order size as si. Let us
denote the j-th bit of si as bij . Alice and Bob, for each
bit bij , choose rij
R←− Z∗p.
7) Alice and Bob encrypt each bit bij using EC ElGamal,
(Aij , Bij) = (bijG+rijP, rijG). Alice and Bob, for all
bits bij , send each other the corresponding encryption
together with a ZK proof that it encrypts either a zero
or a one.
8) Alice and Bob perform the following calculations, for
all j ∈ [1, . . . , k]:
Vj = G+A2j −A1j +
k∑
d=j+1
(2d − 2)(A1d −A2d)
Uj = B2j −B1j +
k∑
d=j+1
(2d − 2)(B1d −B2d)
9) Alice shuffles the k vectors (Vj , Uj) by the index j and
sends the shuffled vectors to Bob together with a ZK
proof of correct shuffle.
10) Bob shuffles the k vectors (Vj , Uj) by the index j and
sends the shuffled vectors to Alice together with a ZK
proof of correct shuffle.
11) Alice and Bob choose, for all j, mij
R←− Z∗p. Alice and
Bob calculate, for all j, V ij = mijVj and U
i
j = mijUj ,
and send it to each other together with a proof of
logarithm equality.
12) Alice and Bob calculate, for all j, W ij = xi(U
1
j + U
2
j )
and send it to each other together with a proof of
logarithm equality.
13) Alice and Bob compute, for all j:
Tj = (V
1
j + V
2
j )− (W 1j +W 2j )
14) Alice and Bob, for all j, decrypt together all Tj . If, for
any j, Tj = O, then s1 > s2, meaning Alice’s order is
bigger than Bob’s. Otherwise, s1 ≤ s2, meaning Bob’s
order is bigger than Alice’s. Let us assume that Bob’s
order is bigger.
15) Alice calculates ri =
∑
j = 1
k2j−1rij and sends si and
ri to Bob.
3
16) Bob checks that siG+ riP =
∑
j = 1
k2j−1Aij .
17) At this point Alice and Bob can begin settlement of the
trade. The specifics depend on the method chosen.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed how a dark pool can be imple-
mented through a cryptographic protocol. Such a protocol
allows non-custodial cryptocurrency trades that do not leak
any information about order sizes without requiring a trusted
server.
We hope that this protocol will bring more institutional in-
vestors and other large traders into the cryptocurrency market.
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